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The High-Level Board of Experts on the Fu-
ture of Global Trade Governance 
The Bertelsmann Stiftung has called into life a 
High-Level Board of Experts on the Future of 
Global Trade Governance. Composed of eminent 
experts and seasoned trade diplomats, it elabo-
rated a number of recommendations to increase 
the effectiveness and salience of the WTO. The 
entirety of these recommendations and underly-
ing analysis of the changing political economy of 
international production and trade can be found in 
the Board’s report “Revitalizing Multilateral Gov-
ernance at the WTO”, authored by Prof Bernard 
Hoekman. This briefing is part of a series of six, 
each of which details one specific recommenda-
tion from the report. 
The full report can be accessed https://www.ber-
telsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publika-
tionen/GrauePublikationen/MT_Report_Revitaliz-
ing_Multilateral_Governance_at_the_WTO.pdf.  
 
 
Review of organizational performance 
The WTO is unique among international organiza-
tions in not having either an independent evalua-
tion office or an internal review mechanism that 
assesses the operation of the institution.  
Periodic assessments of the WTO’s institutional 
performance can foster learning about what works 
well and what does not. Formal review mecha-
nisms can act as a mirror for members, presenting 
them with facts they may not be fully aware of, as 
well as provide information that is useful in con-
sidering what might be done to improve perfor-
mance. Review can foster learning and incentivize 
constructive engagement by members.  
The WTO has an Office of Internal Oversight re-
sponsible for conducting internal audits, investiga-
tions and “any other assessment deemed neces-
sary to strengthen accountability, internal con-
trols, compliance, value-for-money and govern-
ance in the WTO Secretariat.” The director of this 
office is part of the Secretariat and, as such, 
she/he is appointed by the director general, after 
consulting the Committee of Budget and Financial 
Administration. The Office of Internal Oversight 
can perform evaluations, but it reports to the di-
rector general, not to the General Council (WTO 
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members) and is mostly devoted to internal audits 
and investigations.  
Assessing the performance of the different parts 
of the WTO can help to identify both good prac-
tices and reasons why performance in some ar-
eas may be below what it could be. Two options 
can be considered: an internal process or an in-
dependent, external evaluation mechanism. Ex-
ternal evaluation is used in many organizations as 
an efficient way of facilitating learning. Prominent 
examples are the World Bank Independent Eval-
uation Group and the IMF Independent Evaluation 
Office. Putting in place a similar evaluation func-
tion could help identify weaknesses that may not 
emerge through internal reflections and generate 
‘hard facts’ that some WTO members might prefer 
to ignore. Creating an independent external eval-
uation function will require substantial preparation 
to attract the necessary consensus. An internal re-
flection process, in contrast, may be put in place 
more easily.  
Internal review could build on the model that has 
been put in place at the OECD. This involves a 
small internal unit that works with each Commit-
tee’s ‘bureau’ but drafts its own report on the op-
eration of the relevant Committee. Thus, there is 
no independent external evaluation (and evalua-
tors) – the process relies on delegations sup-
ported by a small number of OECD staff (Wolfe, 
2018). A feature of the process is that it encour-
ages learning across Committees and helps iden-
tify potential ‘silo problems’ created by the issue-
specific focus of Committees and that preclude a 
more holistic focus on a problem area. The OECD 
structure is not dissimilar to the WTO in that it re-
lies heavily on working groups and committees 
that report to an overarching Council and a Minis-
terial Conference.  
Considering whether the issue-specific focus of 
WTO bodies results in policy areas being ad-
dressed in a too piecemeal fashion and identifying 
areas where more regular interaction between 
WTO bodies can fill gaps and exploit synergies 
can help ensure the WTO is responsive and re-
mains relevant. The need for cross-cutting ap-
proaches is increasing as a result of production 
processes that span many sectors and are af-
fected by many different policy instruments.  
There is substantial scope for cross-Committee 
learning, including on working practices. An im-
portant dimension of what the WTO does is com-
piling information on new trade measures, largely 
based on notifications by members. As is well 
known, WTO Member performance on notification 
leaves much to be desired, as is reflected inter 
alia by WTO monitoring of trade policies, annual 
reports on notifications by WTO members.  
Performance of WTO bodies varies widely, with 
some Committees doing a much better job than 
others in inducing notifications. Regular review of 
the work of these Committees can help identify 
differences in performance and reasons for them, 
and inform assessments of whether successful 
practices might be emulated in other areas. 
For example, the notification record of WTO bod-
ies dealing with product regulation – the Commit-
tees on Technical Barriers to Trade and on Sani-
tary and Phytosanitary Measures – swamps that 
of other WTO bodies. While this is in part a func-
tion of the types of policy measures concerned, 
differences in performance may be related to pro-
cedures used by these committees to develop and 
implement work programs that may be transfera-
ble. 
One such procedure is the ability to raise ‘specific 
trade concerns’ regarding proposed or existing 
product standards. Over 800 issues have been 
raised between 1995 and 2015. This process is 
widely regarded as being a useful mechanism to 
address the concerns raised – about 40% of spe-
cific trade concerns relating to sanitary and phyto-
sanitary measures reportedly were resolved. 
What has been done in these Committees con-
trasts with other WTO bodies, which have been 
less pro-active and innovative in engaging with 
each other on substantive policy issues, debating 
the potential effects on trade of extant or proposed 
policies, or on mapping out and learning about the 
operation and effects of policies. At present there 
is too little focus on operation and performance of 
WTO bodies. Any WTO-wide review should in-
volve the Committees and draw on a bottom-up 
committee-by-committee self-assessments of 
weaknesses in WTO information provision. It 
should go beyond this to also report indicators of 
participation by Members and engagement with 
stakeholders. The WTO AnnualRreport includes 
some measures of participation – e.g. the number 
of questions raised by developed vs. developing 
countries on notifications made to Committees; 
number of specific trade concerns raised in Com-
mittees; contributions to the Global Trust Fund; 
and participation in dispute settlement. More such 
specific information on metrics that are salient 
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from the perspective of the operation of the insti-
tution would help to assess performance of WTO 
members.  
The goal here should not be to engage in a bean-
counting exercise but to collect and present infor-
mation that helps to inform delegations as well as 
business and other groups at home. Examples of 
potentially useful performance indicators could in-
clude the number of proposals put forward by in-
dividual members; the number of joint papers/pro-
posals made; support requested and provided by 
the Secretariat; the number of agenda items ad-
dressing thematic issues as opposed to narrow 
implementation of WTO agreements; how long 
specific proposals for deliberation on an issue 
have been on the table without consensus being 
possible; measures of capital-based engagement 
in meetings; and indicators to measure interac-
tions with and participation by non-governmental 
entities (international organizations, business rep-
resentatives, NGOs).  
The compilation of such information would com-
plement the annual reporting by subsidiary bod-
ies and internal review of the operation of subsid-
iary bodies to inform an annual discussion in the 
General Council as part of its broader appraisal 
of the functioning of the trading system. As part 
of its oversight function, the WTO General Coun-
cil already conducts a year-end review of WTO 
activities, based on annual reports of its subsidi-
ary bodies. However, the latter are largely limited 
to summaries of meetings and topics discussed. 
There is little substantive deliberation in the Gen-
eral Council on the operation and performance of 
subsidiary bodies. The current annual review by 
the General Council of the activities of subsidiary 
bodies as summarized in the WTO Annual Re-
port is primarily focused on the trade policy mat-
ters covered by each body. There is no evidence 
of effort to reflect on lessons or transferability of 
approaches from one committee to other bodies.   
A greater focus on review of the functioning and 
operation of the WTO as an organization would 
make this process more meaningful and informa-
tive. More important, it could help identify oppor-
tunities to improve performance. 
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